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2Effectiveness of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights—A 
Case Study of Nicaragua, 1978-1992 
 
They always say time changes things, but you actually have to change them yourself. 
-Andy Warhol 
I. INTRODUCTION –  
 After 1970, many Latin American countries experienced economic crisis and the 
development of dictatorial, repressive regimes. Given this political situation, the 
development of a human rights ethic among the diplomatic community was particularly 
challenging. Civil unrest and revolution in many countries gave the human rights 
movement1 a sense of urgency, and simultaneously created resistance against outside 
involvement in the domestic policies of sovereign states.  
 However, in the late 1970s many of these regimes began to crumble. In 1979, 
two-thirds of Latin America was ruled by some form of authoritarianism. By 1993, 
military regimes in Latin America had been practically eliminated.2 This process began 
when popular movements gained momentum and democratic processes, such as elections, 
began to occur more frequently. Concern for civil rights and democratization led to a 
widespread interest in the promotion of human rights throughout the region. 
 
1 The international human rights movement was born in 1948, when the Organization of American States 
adopted the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. Six months later, the United Nations 
adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In the following decades, other non-governmental 
organizations focused on human rights protection would emerge; the most notable of them was Amnesty 
International, which was founded in 1961. 
2 Brian Loveman. “’Protected Democracies’ and Military Guardianship: Political Transitions in Latin 
America, 1978-1993”, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 36, no. 2 (1994), 105. 
3The Inter-American Human Rights Commission, a subset of the Organization of 
American States, was an integral participant in the development of human rights policies 
throughout Latin America. Its involvement in Nicaragua during the 1979 Sandinista 
Revolution, and in the decade that followed, exemplifies not only the range of issues that 
the Commission dealt with, but also the circumstances in which its influence was the 
strongest. This paper will use the relations between Nicaragua and the Commission to 
illustrate the extent of its authority concerning domestic human rights issues, its impact 
when promoting regime change, as well as situations when the Commission finds itself 
powerless. 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights’ role as an investigative body 
reveals abuses that would otherwise have gone unheeded by the international community, 
particularly in times of political upheaval and revolution. As a monitoring mechanism for 
the Organization of American States, the Commission can play a major role in 
influencing the human rights policies of a country in transition, or in the process of 
establishing a new government. But as the Commission’s involvement in Nicaraguan 
human rights issues at the end of the Somoza regime in 1978, during the 1979 
Nicaraguan Revolution and during the decade of Sandinista rule demonstrates, the 
Commission does not wield the same influence in a country with a securely established 
government. Because it lacks the authority to enforce its recommendations, it can be 
easily ignored during periods when there is no threat of civil strife. 
 This study will examine the Commission’s reports on the human rights situation 
in Nicaragua from 1978 to 1992, including two major reports that derived from on-site 
visits to the country. The following recurring issues will be the focus of my study: the use 
4of state of emergency laws, the right to life3, due process rights, freedom of expression 
and political pluralism. The recommendations of the Commission will be compared to the 
government’s willingness to comply. As my research shows, the influence that the 
Commission wields on a state’s human rights practices varies depending on the stability 
of the government. 
History of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission 
 The first half of the twentieth century was a time of slow but certain consolidation 
of government power in the executive branch, often times at the hands of a ruthless 
dictator backed by the military. After World War II, many Latin American countries 
adhered to a transnational political ideology known as Pan-Americanism. This policy was 
created by Simon Bolívar to unite all Latin American nations into an integrated 
international trade system. Also, Pan-Americanism was a political program whose aim 
was to “defend democracy” and fight communism.4 In the 1960s and 1970s, authoritarian 
military regimes with fervently anti-communist agendas came to power in many Latin 
American countries. Authoritarian regimes were entrenched in Argentina, Venezuela, 
Nicaragua and Paraguay, among others.5 The leaders of these regimes were often 
supported by the United States; the military was focused on crushing 
“counterinsurgencies” through methods such as torture, execution and forced 
disappearance. Populations were deprived of their civil and human rights with no 
recourse in either the domestic or the international spheres. 
 
3 The term “right to life” is a legal phrase which describes a human being’s right to life and liberty of 
person. In international law, violations of the right to life include arbitrary execution and disappearance. 
This usage is not the same as the term “right to life” as it is interpreted in the United States, namely 
opposition to abortion rights. 
4 “The Military in Latin America”. Proceso, (San Salvador, El Salvador: Center for Information, 
Documentation and Research Support of the Central American University, 1995), 1-3. 
5 M. Margaret Ball. “Issue for the Americas: Non-Intervention v. Human Rights and the Preservation of 
Democratic Institutions.” International Organization 15, no.1 (1961), 27. 
5The Organization of American States, created April 30th, 1948, was born out of 
the need for an international body to provide a forum for diplomatic debate and 
negotiation between states in the Western Hemisphere.6 As Pan-Americanism and 
authoritarian military regimes took hold, the Organization of American States adopted the 
American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man in 1948.7 This non-binding 
document outlined a regional standard for human rights and the duties of both 
governments and citizens.8 While this document demonstrated the enthusiasm and 
interest of the community in promoting human rights, it was also riddled with 
problematic obstacles, the most important of which hit at the core of Latin American 
diplomatic policy: the supremacy of sovereignty and non-intervention.9 The OAS Charter 
clearly prioritizes sovereignty, committing itself to non-intervention in the domestic 
policies of member states, which takes precedence over the issue of human rights10:
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or 
indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of 
any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but 
also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the 
personality of the State or against its political, economic, and cultural 
elements.11 
Although it is a necessary element in international law, this policy of non-
intervention continues to be the biggest obstacle in enforcing punitive measures against 
 
6Ibid,  23.  
7 Ibid, 25. 
8 Ibid, 25. 
9 Ibid, 21-23. 
10 The member states of the OAS include most of Latin America as well as the United States. Hence, this 
interest in state sovereignty and non-intervention does not stem from the United States’ historical 
involvement in Latin American affairs. Rather, the creation of international organizations such as the UN 
and the OAS would not have been possible without an emphasis on sovereignty—the United States, as well 
as many other countries, would not have become members of these organizations without a guarantee that 
their sovereignty would be respected. 
11 Charter of the Organization of American States, Chapter IV, Article 19. Available from OAS website: 
http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang=E&sLink=http://www.oas.org/key_issues/eng; Internet, 
accessed 25 February, 2005. 
6human rights abusers. As historian Margaret Ball notes, “It is possible, of course, for the 
American republics to declare—as they have declared—that human rights should be 
protected and the cause of democracy promoted. As long as these remain no more than 
pronouncements, and as long as no effort is made to secure compliance [with 
international human rights declarations].”12 In 1959, the Fifth Meeting of Foreign 
Ministers in Santiago, Chile took the first step in rectifying this problem by adopting a 
resolution to create “an Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.” In 1960, the 
Statute of the Commission was promulgated. At first glance, the Commission seemed to 
be a research and advisory body. Later, however, it became increasingly proactive in 
pressuring countries to promote human rights.13 Historian José A. Cabranes argues that 
the only reason member states supported the Commission was that they were under the 
impression that it would merely be a “study group”.14 
The Commission was institutionalized in the 1970 Protocol of Buenos Aires. It 
was added to the OAS Charter and given the responsibility of overseeing human rights in 
the region, in accordance with the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of 
Man. Legally, the OAS cannot force states to comply with the Declaration; but just like 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, passed by the United Nations in 1948, it 
serves as the standard for human rights practices in the region.  
 In 1969 the Council of the OAS opened the American Convention on Human 
Rights for signature, allowing member states to sign the document.15 This document’s 
 
12 Ball, “Issue for the Americas,” 29.  
13 Thomas Buergenthal. “The Revised OAS Charter and the Protection of Human Rights,” The American 
Journal of International Law 69, no. 4 (1975), 830. 
14 Jose A. Cabranes. “The Protection of Human Rights by the Organization of American States,” The 
American Journal of International Law 62, no. 4 (1968), 894. 
15 This is also known as the “Pact of San José”. Ibid, 834.  
7importance in human rights law cannot be overstated. Its purpose is to build a body of 
customary human rights law upon which to establish precedent, and to create an Inter-
American Court of Human Rights. The Convention finally came into effect in 1978 along 
with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights Statute, which went into effect in 
1979.16 To explain why it took so long for member states to sign on, one must look no 
further than the state of deep political turmoil in which Latin America found itself 
entrenched. Immediately, the Commission went to work in Nicaragua, where the 
Somocista regime was experiencing the early upsurges of civil war. 
History of the Nicaraguan Conflict: The Somoza Regime and the Revolution 
 What is commonly known as the “Somoza regime” is the period between 1937 
and 1979. During this period, three members of the Somoza family served as president of 
Nicaragua. Anastasio Somoza García served from 1937-1947, and again from 1950 to 
1956, when he was assassinated. His eldest son, Luis Somoza Debayle, succeeded him 
and was president from 1956 to 1967. Finally, after Luis suffered a heart attack, his 
younger brother Anastasio Somoza Debayle took power until 1979, when he was forced 
to resign. The Somoza regime was an authoritarian military dictatorship, with power 
completely consolidated in the hands of the Somoza family and the army, also known as 
the National Guard. 
 Starting in 1961, with the founding of the Sandinista National Liberation Front, 
the movement for national liberation began to fight back against the oppressive and 
corrupt Somoza government. The FSLN led a guerilla war against the National Guard, 
and after several years garnered widespread support from many sectors of the population, 
 
16 “Historia”. Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. Available from 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/inf_general/historia.html; Internet, accessed December 3, 2004. 
8including the peasantry, business owners and the press. After a devastating earthquake 
destroyed the city of Managua on December 23rd, 1972, the resulting economic and 
human catastrophe added to the population’s frustration and desperation. On January 10th,
1978, the assassination of a popular press figure, Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, resulted in 
nation-wide protests against the government, many of which ended violently. Finally, the 
clashes between the National Guard, the Sandinista guerillas and the citizenry erupted 
into a violent civil war. 
 When news of these horrific events reached the international community, the 
Organization of American States assigned the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights to conduct and investigation of the human rights policies of the Somoza 
government. Because of its mounting concern that the situation was becoming 
increasingly volatile and that the citizenry’s fundamental rights were being denied, the 
Commission scheduled an on-site visit. 
 
II. THE COMMISSION’S 1978 “ON-SITE” VISIT TO NICARAGUA 
 
The Commission’s first visit to Nicaragua occurred during a particularly dramatic 
period in the country’s history. Revolution had broken out in 1978 in response to years of 
repression at the hands of an authoritarian dictatorship.17 Protests took place throughout 
the country, and the Commission received serious complaints alleging egregious 
violations of human rights.  
 
17 Although the broad uprising against the government began in 1978, armed struggle and protests against 
the government had been occurring since the early 70’s. 
9The Nicaraguan Revolution deeply affected every sector of society, as made 
evident by the range of violations illustrated by the complaints filed with the 
Commission. Some of the most serious complaints concerned the disappearance of over 
300 farmers at the hands of the National Guard between 1975 and 1977. Only seven were 
released, after having been imprisoned for 18 months. Members of the Guard 
appropriated the farms of the remaining farmers, who were presumed dead. 18 In January 
of 1978, after the start of a general strike, university students and women’s groups 
complained of the violent dispersion of peaceful protests using tear gas dropped from 
helicopters.19 Perhaps the most publicized and incendiary event occurred on January 10th,
1978. The assassination of the managing editor of La Prensa newspaper, Pedro Joaquín 
Chamorro, and the resulting demonstrations, underscored the regime’s malicious 
suppression of freedom of expression. 
 In addition to violations of the right to life, due process and civil rights, the 
Commission wanted to investigate the abuse of state of emergency laws, that had resulted 
in flagrant abuses of civil and human rights. I will discuss this investigation first, and 
then move to right to life cases and those concerning freedom of expression, assembly, 
and political conscience. 
State of Emergency Laws 
 At the time of the Commission’s visit, the Nicaraguan government was operating 
under Article 197 of the Constitution, which provided for the suspension of fundamental 
rights in case of a national crisis, also known as a state of emergency. The Commission 
 
18 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Republic 
of Nicaragua – 17 November 1978. Available from 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/Nicaragua78eng/TOC.htm; Internet, accessed 22 February 2005. 
Introduction-A 
19 Ibid, Introduction-A 
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found the government’s use of this provision as too sweeping, for two reasons. First, this 
state of emergency was in effect during the greater part of President Somoza’s 
administration, which began on December 1st, 1974.20 From that date until November 10, 
1978 (a period of three years, eleven months and ten days), the country had been in a 
state of emergency periodically for two years, ten months and eleven days, and had had 
full constitutional rights for only one year, one month and two days.21 It was the 
Commission’s view that Article 197 was not designed to be in effect for prolonged 
periods of time and went into effect for no other reason than to maintain compliance with 
government policy without the possibility of recourse: 
These provisions, which make up the emergency regime, prevailing in 
Nicaragua, create in the socio-economic reality of the country, a legal 
structure from the formal point of view, but from the practical point of 
view, this turns into a legal abnormality, since it lends itself to a 
systematic and generalized violation of human rights established by the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.22 
The Commission’s second concern was that the Nicaraguan government had 
declared a state of emergency when it was officially and legally unjustifiable. The latest 
suspension of constitutional rights, instituted on October 12, 1978, was declared as a 
response to the armed attacks that had occurred against the National Guard since October 
1977. According to the government, the growing campaign of government opposition 
amounted to subversive propaganda and threats to the security of the constitutional 
government. The government contended that resistance groups had affiliations with 
“Marxist mercenaries and terrorists of different nationalities” as well as “leaders of 
 
20 Ibid, I-A 
21 Ibid, I-D  
22 Ibid, I-D. 
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international communism.”23 However, in the course of its investigation the Commission 
found that another decree had been promulgated earlier, which declared that the National 
Guard had “accomplished its patriotic duty of reestablishing domestic tranquility and 
guaranteeing the independence of the nation and the integrity of its territory that was 
threatened by terrorists inspired by international communism.”24 This decree in effect 
showed that the government recognized that domestic peace had been established to a 
sufficient degree. The Commission noted that, “The prolongation of that abnormal legal 
situation doesn’t make sense if the situation that caused it has been officially declared as 
ended.”25 
The Right to Life 
The bulk of complaints received by the Commission during this visit were related 
to violations of the right to life. The outbreak of violence during protests throughout the 
country and the use of urban guerilla warfare resulted in widespread civilian casualties 
and arbitrary executions. Correspondence with the Nicaraguan government prior to the 
visit led to a response from Dr. Julio C. Quintana, Minister of Foreign Affairs, who 
assured the Commission: 
I am pleased to state to you that the Nicaraguan people enjoy full freedom 
and the exercise of rights guaranteed by our Constitution and other laws of 
the Republic, which incorporate and enforce human rights as part of our 
juridical tradition, in accordance with the Nicaraguan political reality 
based on a representative democracy. These guarantees and rights have 
not been suspended, in spite of violent events and subversive actions of 
extremist groups which threaten the peace of the Republic.26 
23 Ibid, I-B. 
24Ibid,  I-B. 
25Ibid,  I-B. 
26 Ibid, Introduction, A. 
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In spite of government assurances, the delegation’s investigation of right to life 
cases was extensive. The Commission was mainly concerned with the following 
violations, which are discussed below: death of unarmed civilians during combat, deaths 
involving Red Cross personnel, deaths occurring as part of “Operation Mop-Up,” deaths 
after the cessation of hostilities, and the disappearance of farmers.27 
Noting that Nicaragua is a signatory of the Geneva Convention on the Protection 
of Civilians in Time of War, the Commission condemned harming unarmed citizens 
during armed conflicts.28 Regarding the National Guard’s indiscriminate bombing of 
cities using heavy artillery (particularly in León, Masaya, Jinotepe, Estelí and 
Chinandega), the Commission expressed extreme dissatisfaction. After quoting from 
several complaints, the Commission concluded: 
The Commission is totally convinced that the Nicaraguan National Guard 
not only used its firepower indiscriminately causing a great number of 
casualties and tremendous suffering to the civilian population, but that it 
also ordered the people to remain inside their homes before bombing, 
without even allowing them to evacuate, thus violating a basic 
humanitarian norm.29 
Abuses committed against Red Cross personnel involved one incident that 
occurred on September 14th, 1978. An ambulance and jeep carrying medicine and food, 
answering a request for aid, were machine-gunned by a military convoy and shot at from 
a helicopter, despite being marked as Red Cross vehicles. Upon further investigation, the 
Commission discovered that the attack had been a mistake—the National Guardsmen had 
hit the wrong target. A taped conversation between Colonel Humberto Corrales and 
Major Anastasio Somoza, President Somoza’s son, revealed an attempted cover-up. 
 
27 Ibid, II-A. 
28 Ibid, II-B. 
29 Ibid, II-B. 
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According to the transcript, Major Somoza ordered Corrales, “You say that the 
ambulance was stolen with two dead guards…and it was heard by the patrol that was 
coming…we already made friends with the Red Cross, but tell them that the guerillas 
insist on using Red Cross ambulances.”30 
The Commission deemed the attack “inexcusable.” Other attacks against 
volunteers occurred were noted with less detail. All these events not only demonstrate the 
danger that international aid organizations faced in Nicaragua during this time, but also 
the lack of respect for their humanitarian work on the part of the government. 31 In 
general, the government did little to protect members of aid organizations from being 
targeted. 
 “Operation Mop-up” was a military operation designed “to annihilate the last 
pockets of resistance” throughout the country. It consisted of arbitrary execution and 
imprisonment of non-combatants implicated in the armed resistance.32 The Commission 
visited many of the areas where the worst crimes had allegedly been committed, and the 
information gathered led to the following conclusion: 
…the Nicaraguan National Guard’s actions during the phase called 
‘Operation Mop-up’ were marked by complete disregard for human life, 
that they shot numerous people, in some cases children, in their own 
homes or in front of the same and in the presence of parents and siblings.33 
The insidious events that took place during “Operation Mop-up” are particularly 
shocking because they constituted a systematic plan to target civilians based on their 
political affiliation. Similarly, after the end of the armed conflict, many people were 
 
30 Ibid, II-C. 
31 Ibid, II-C. 
32 Ibid, II-D. 
33 Ibid, II-D. 
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killed without proper justification. The testimonies collected by the Commission illustrate 
the devastating effects of such cruelty on families and communities, who pled with the 
Commission to help them find their relatives or to bring the perpetrators to justice. 
 As noted before, the Commission considered the disappearance of 321 farmers 
between 1975 and 1977 a “grave violation of the right to life.”34 However, the 
Nicaraguan judicial system failed to investigate the charges properly, and little had been 
done at the time of the report’s publication, despite the Commission’s insistence. 
 The protection of the right to life is fundamental to democracy. The 
Commission’s findings demonstrate that the Somoza regime disregarded this right before, 
during, and after the armed conflict. However, as it was still in control of all military, 
administrative and judicial government structures, the Somoza government did little to 
investigate these crimes and punish guilty parties. Forcing the government to carry out 
investigations was beyond the scope of the Commission’s power, and therefore many 
crimes committed during this period went unpunished.  
The Rights of Imprisoned Persons and Due Process 
 Not only was the murder of many innocent people a major concern, so was the 
cruel and groundless imprisonment of thousands of others. Articles 197 and 52 of the 
Nicaraguan Constitution prohibited acts of cruelty and torture against detained persons. 
The Commission visited most detention facilities and received complaints of physical and 
psychological torture, and took note of the highly unsanitary, crowded conditions and a 
 
34 “Personal integrity” refers to the right to personal privacy, private property, and habeas corpus. It also 
refers to humane treatment while in prison. Ibid, II-F. 
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lack of proper medical care for prisoners. The Commission paid special attention to these 
violations of the right to personal integrity35 and other violations of due process.36 
Gathering information in prisons proved difficult. Prisoners were frightened about 
the possible repercussions of their testimonies The Commission noted that given their 
visible scars and condition during the interviews, it was evident that many prisoners had 
been hung by their arms, received electric shocks, had their ribs broken, and nursed 
unattended injuries (including bullet wounds).37 Delegates verified that many prisoners 
were as young as 14 years of age.38 
In addition, many prisoners were held incommunicado and with no legal 
representation. Ordinarily, prisoners were given summary sentences by chiefs of police, a 
policy established by the Police Regulations of 1880 (deemed anachronistic by the 
Commission).39 Evidence was not required to impose a sentence, and oftentimes the 
accused was denied access to legal counsel.   
 Under the Somoza government, the role of police chief was filled out by a 
commandant of the National Guard, fusing the military and criminal justice systems. The 
state of emergency allowed for the creation of Military Courts, which usurped the role of 
Criminal Courts and the Supreme Court. This arrangement seriously undercut the 
possibility that political prisoners would have a fair trial. 
 The Constitution allowed for imprisonment for political reasons. According to 
Article 195, the President could order the imprisonment of individuals who might have 
 
35 Ibid, Chapter III, “The Right to Personal Integrity.” 
36 Ibid, Chapter IV, “Physical Freedom and the Administration of Justice.” 
37 Ibid, III-B. 
38 The Nicaraguan Constitution stated that minors should be relegated to special juvenile detention centers. 
Ibid, IV-D. 
39 Ibid, IV-B. 
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disturbed public order, but the maximum period of incarceration was ten days. Further 
detention required a meeting with a judge. The Commission recorded many cases in 
which prisoners were held longer than ten days, without being allowed the right to 
habeas corpus and without being taken to court.40 
In the estimation of the Commission, the deplorable state of the legal system and 
criminal proceedings comprised a violation of due process, compounded by the 
capricious application of laws: 
…there exists a dichotomy between the Constitution and the interpretation 
of it by the National Guard and other governmental authorities. Its 
application depends upon the interpretation which the government deems 
most accommodating in each case presented, and the judicial authorities 
do not adopt the necessary corrective measures.41 
The Commission requested that the commandants of the prisons investigate cases 
of torture, and received assurances that investigations would take place. At the date of 
publication of the On-site Report, however, the authorities had not charged anyone for 
torture or unacceptable abuse.42 It is evident that these officials were not intimidated by 
the Commission, and felt that it was unnecessary to follow their recommendations. At 
this point in time, the Commission posed no threat to their jobs, and they were simply 
brushed off. Despite the Commission’s strong criticism of the judicial processes taking 
place in Nicaragua, and the government’s cooperation with regards to giving them access 
to prisoners and facilities, the Commission was generally unsuccessful in obtaining the 
government’s cooperation with regards to reform. 
 
40 Ibid, IV-B. 
41 Ibid, IV-B. 
42 Ibid, III-B. 
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Freedom of Expression 
 The Commission’s investigation was prompted in large part by the high-profile 
assassination of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, an event that also raised concerns about 
censorship. In this report, the Commission notes the great difference between the freedom 
of the press guaranteed by Articles 71 and 72 of the Constitution and the restriction of the 
Nicaraguan press in practice. A critical law, Decree No. 523, seriously limited the content 
of published material. Generally, any material that could be interpreted by the 
government as subversive propaganda, as well as “false news” and Marxist or atheist 
material was prohibited. Also, any commentary which made derogatory or critical 
commentary about the government was not allowed. 43 
Due to the vagueness of Decree No. 523, as well as the limitations it implied, the 
Commission found the law extremely alarming. Any information on the encounters 
between the National Guard and the resistance, reports on demonstrations or the state of 
affairs in rural regions, and calls for the punishment of corrupt officials was restricted or 
disallowed. 44 
The Commission visited Nicaragua at a time of sweeping government censorship. 
In the estimation of the Commission and the Inter-American Press Association, the 
freedom of the press and the liberty of journalists to work unhampered in Nicaragua was 
uncertain at best. At worst, it constituted a threat to the personal safety of journalists.45 It 
would not, however, be the actions of the Commission or the Inter-American Press 
 
43 Article 71 states, “No one can be molested nor persecuted for the expression of his opinions nor for any 
act which is not against the law.” Article 72 states, “Every person may communicate his thoughts orally or 
in writing, and publish them without prior censorship; but he shall be responsible for the abuses committed 
in the exercise of this rights, in the cases and in the manner determined by law.” Ibid, V-A. 
44 Ibid, V-B. 
45 Ibid, V-B. 
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Association that would give freedom of expression back to the Nicaraguan people. It was 
the eventual triumph of the revolution which would allow for the Commission’s 
recommendations to be taken into account. 
Findings and  Recommendations of the Commission 
 The administration of justice and interpretation of laws in Nicaragua during the 
Somoza regime was capricious and largely unconcerned with human rights. The 
unreliable enforcement of laws provided dangerous opportunities for abuse. Loveman 
notes that this was intrinsic to a Latin American authoritarian dictatorship: 
Each country has its own archive of legislation that permits political 
repression, censorship of the press, and the selective persecution of those 
deemed undesirable at the time: anarchists, socialists, communists, 
fascists…or just ambiguously defined subversives, terrorists, and 
bandits.46 
The Commission’s visit to Nicaragua in 1978 and the report it published had 
several effects. As an investigative body, the Commission uncovered a record of 
widespread denial of human rights and made it available to the international community. 
It served as an evaluation of the effects of the Somoza regime and the subsequent 
revolution on the entire spectrum of Nicaraguan society. In retrospect, the Commission 
report provides some of the most valuable objective documentation from a non-affiliated 
source of these harrowing years. It also confirmed allegations of violence and injustice in 
the form of testimonial interviews and on-site inquiry. 
 As an official reporter for the Organization of American States, the Commission 
was responsible for ensuring that the Nicaraguan government complied with the 
 
46 Loveman, “Protected Democracies,”138. 
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American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. It found the government of 
Nicaragua to be in serious violation of the following articles: 
 a) Article I – the right to life, liberty and security of person. 
 b) Article XXV – the rights to humane treatment while in custody and habeas 
 corpus. 
c) Article XXVIII – the right of due process 
 d) Article III – the right to freely profess a religion 
 e) Article XXI – the right of assembly and demonstration. 
 
The Commission did face one glaring setback. Because it was limited to 
investigating the human rights violations of the government, the Commission was neither 
able to investigate nor in a position to comment on crimes committed by members of the 
FSLN and other resistance groups. According to the report, “In view of the fact that such 
complaints, in light of the Statute and Regulations of the Commission, fall outside its 
competence, the Commission has not been able to give them the pertinent processing.”47 
It would not be until the FSLN came to power in the early 1980s that the Commission 
would able to investigate its abuses. This demonstrates a serious limitation of the report. 
In its investigation of the political situation if this period, the Commission could not 
evaluate the reciprocal violence committed by members of the resistance forces. 
 Several issues are important to note. Because of the triumph of the Nicaraguan 
Revolution in 1979 and the subsequent collapse of the Somoza government, it is not 
possible to gauge whether this report would have prompted any policy changes on the 
part of the regime. But as a result of its interest in the human rights situation in 
Nicaragua, the Commission later became extremely involved in planning the structure of 
the new government, taking into account the injustices of the Somocista period. 
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 When the Commission arrived in Nicaragua, a revolution was already taking 
place. However, their report made many recommendations as to how the Somoza 
government could reform its policies in order to comply with international human rights 
standards. The Commission was not able to persuade the government to enact any 
significant changes. However, the on-site report is a collection of objective evidence of 
abuse, and provided recourse for victims whose complaints to the government were 
falling on deaf ears. In addition, the Commission’s report was shared with the 
international community, which became aware of the many crimes committed during the 
Somoza period. It was because of its role as an investigative body that the Commission 
earned an important advisory role in the establishment of a new Nicaraguan government. 
 
III. THE COMMISSION’S 1981 “ON-SITE” VISIT TO NICARAGUA 
 
On this occasion, the Commission was invited by the Government of National 
Reconstruction of Nicaragua to evaluate the human rights situation in the country, which 
prompted an on-site visit in 1981.  
 This report begins with an update on the actions of the Organization of American 
States in the interim period between on-site visits, given the political developments in 
Nicaragua and the findings of the Commission in 1978. Most notably, on June 23rd, 1979,
for the first time in the history of any international organization, the OAS deprived a 
government of a member state of its legitimacy. The resolution called for the “immediate 
and definitive replacement of the Somoza regime” and supported the establishment of a 
new executive body—a five-member junta which would become the Government of 
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National Reconstruction. The creation of this governing body was spearheaded by the 
Sandinista National Liberation Front, or FSLN, which was also responsible for the 
military victory against Somoza.48 
The FSLN actively sought the assistance of the OAS to create a “Plan to Achieve 
Peace,” which would outline the creation of a permanent democratic government in 
accordance with international human rights standards.49 The stages of the plan included 
the resignation of Somoza, a peaceful cease-fire, and the dissolution of the Constitution 
and National Congress. On July 16th, General Anastasio Somoza tendered his resignation, 
recognizing the OAS’ declaration in his letter, which reads: 
People of Nicaragua:  
Having consulted the governments that truly have an interest in bringing 
peace to the country, I have decided to respect the decision of the 
Organization of American States and do hereby resign the Office of the 
Presidency to which I was elected by popular vote. My resignation is 
irrevocable. 
I have fought against communism and believe that when the truth emerges 
history will vindicate me. 
A. Somoza 
President of the Republic50 
On July 19th, 1979, the Sandinista guerillas occupied Managua and declared a 
cease-fire after a night of heavy battle. The heads of the National Guard surrendered, and 
the next day the Junta of the Government of National Reconstruction came into 
existence.51 On September 25th of that year, upon the request of Chairman of the Inter-
American Commission of Human Rights Andrés Aguilar, the Government of National 
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Reconstruction ratified the American Convention on Human Rights.52 These events 
demonstrate the pivotal role that the Commission and the OAS played in the outcome of 
this civil war. Their efforts not only prompted the resignation of the dictator, but also 
allowed them to participate in creating a human rights-oriented infrastructure for the new 
government. 
 The Commission visited Nicaragua between October 6th and October 11th, 1980.
Government officials were cooperative, and admitted certain problems that had to be 
rectified, which the Commission would also note. The government stated that any 
instances of torture and disappearance were the fault of the former regime, and that the 
problems faced by the new government stemmed mainly from a lack of resources.53 
Notwithstanding, the Commission’s report uncovered serious problems in the new 
government’s administration, especially regarding the right to life, the prison system, and 
the trials taking place against former regime members. As the investigation progressed, it 
would become evident that the Government of National Reconstruction would be 
cooperative in certain areas (such as the state of prisons), but was not compelled to 
comply with Commission recommendations in other areas, such as right to personal 
liberty and a fair trial for those who had been somehow aligned with the Somocistas. 
Despite this, the preliminary recommendations of the report state: 
…the Commission wishes to state, that when compiling the facts narrated 
in the present Report, it was unable to disregard the nature of the previous 
regime, and the repeated violations of human rights committed by its 
authorities, especially the military; the difficulties that the new authorities 
had to confront when they took charge of a country practically destroyed 
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by Civil War and, in that difficult context, the present Government’s 
stated intention to respect human rights.54 
My analysis of the 1980 visit will focus on the following issues: the structure of 
the Fundamental Statute of the new government, the rights to life, personal liberty and 
due process, freedom of thought and expression and political rights. 
Human Rights in the Fundamental Statute 
 The Commission’s review of the Fundamental Statute, issued on July 20th, 1979,
recognized the Junta’s desire to uphold and legally enforce international human rights 
standards as outlined by both the United Nations and the Organization of American 
States. The Fundamental Statute also established a national human rights framework—
the Statute on the Rights and Guarantees of Nicaraguans.55 At this point, the Nicaraguan 
government was actively cooperating with the OAS. An important institution, the 
Council of State, was created to ensure representation of the entire Nicaraguan political 
spectrum, including all existing political parties, the Armed Forces56, the Unión de 
Periodistas de Nicaragua57 and the Asociación de Miskitos, Sumos y Ramas.  
 The structure of the new government mirrors the rights listed in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of 
Man. Some elements, however, are unique to Nicaraguan political circumstances; most 
importantly the final provision of the statute, which limited the declaration of a state of 
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siege. Instead of allowing the executive branch to suspend all constitutional guarantees, 
the right to life, freedom of thought, nationality, juridical capacity and physical and 
psychological integrity were protected even in a state of emergency.58 This marks a 
drastic shift from the policies of the previous regime.  
 One of the most glaringly unique elements of the statute was that the rights listed 
above were not extended to Somocistas being prosecuted by the State. They were thus 
deprived of many vital elements of the juridical process and fair treatment during 
imprisonment. This was one of the primary concerns of the Commission. 59 
It is clear that relations between the fledgling Nicaraguan government and the 
Organization of American States were friendly at this point. Also, the government was 
eager to demonstrate a genuine concern for human rights and a willingness to incorporate 
these rights in the new legal system. However, denying these rights to certain citizens. 
The Somocistas echoed the policies of the previous regime. It raised fears that a gap 
would develop between written laws and the legal system in practice. These fears proved 
to be well-founded, as was demonstrated by the findings of the Commission. 
The Right to Life 
 The Fundamental Statute eliminated the death penalty in Nicaragua, making 
imprisonment the maximum penalty for any crime, including the crimes committed by 
the Somocistas who were being prosecuted. The Junta alerted the world of this decision 
at a press conference held on July 28th, 1979, and clearly considered this announcement 
an important demonstration of its largesse and respect for human rights:60 
58 Ibid,  I-D, Section 4 
59 Ibid,  I-F, Section 9-e. 
60 Ibid,  II-A, Section 2. 
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The death penalty has been buried forever in Nicaragua. It is important 
that the entire world be aware of this decision taken by the FSLN….No 
one can take justice into his own hands. Justice will be the responsibility 
of the government of National Reconstruction, through the juridical 
apparatus—because there will not even be military tribunals--, to judge the 
war criminals who have been the cause of so much injury, so much 
bloodshed and so much pain to this country.61 
It is important to mention that this ethical decision on the part of the government 
marked a definitive shift away from the policies of the previous regime. Also, this meant 
that members of the Somoza regime found guilty of crimes would not be subjected to the 
death penalty. 
 The Commission, while recognizing this important change noted that during the 
month of July, 1979, there were violations of the right to life committed by the Sandinista 
National Liberation Front, mainly in the form of illegal executions.  Among these cases, 
many included the execution and disappearance of civilians whose alleged affiliation 
with right-wing organizations was the justification for their arrest.62 
Upon conferring with the official in charge of complaints for the Ministry of the 
Interior, the Commission was assured that many prison commanders had been dismissed 
from the army. However, many cases were not investigated, despite assurances by the 
government that jurisdictional authorities would handle the matter. This demonstrates the 
declining influence of the Commission at this point. Once Nicaragua’s constitutional 
framework was established, the Commission was relegated to the position of an outside 
observer with little influence over the government’s policy decisions. 
 
61 Speech delivered by Commander Tomás Borge. Ibid,  II-A, Section 2. 
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held. Ibid,  II-B. 
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 Commander Tomás Borge, Minister of the Interior, admitted that summary 
executions had occurred in the first days of the new government. However, in a recorded 
conversation with the Commission, he justified these actions as the natural reaction of a 
population enraged by the brutality of a dictatorial regime, eager to avenge past injuries. 
He also argued that these events were an inevitable result of the chaos that ensued during 
the first days of the new government. However, he stressed that these incidents did not 
constitute the policy of the new Government, but the were the actions of a minority of 
soldiers, many of whom were punished.63 
The Commission, while acknowledging the unique and unfortunate situation 
described by Commander Borge, reiterated the importance of investigating and 
prosecuting alleged perpetrators of human rights violations. 
Personal Liberty and Due Process 
 The main preoccupation of the Commission was the suspension of the rights of 
individuals suspected of crimes that took place during the revolution as well as under the 
previous regime. This suspension of rights, initially a temporary measure, was still in 
effect in 1981, at the time of the Commission’s on-site visit. Foreign Minister Manuel 
D’Escot explained that although these measures were meant to be temporary, the 
extensive damage that the regime caused in Nicaraguan legal institutions (namely the fact 
that it gave juridical power to the military, taking it away from the judiciary branch) 
made it impossible to “maintain a state of juridical normalcy,” especially because of the 
great number of suspects (over 7,500).64 The Commission admitted that the lack of civil 
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servants was an obstacle in holding fair trials, but also reiterated that the decrees denying 
certain due process rights to detainees were in violation of human rights standards. 
 Special Tribunals were created on November 29th, 1979 to bring to trial 
Somocistas suspected of crimes committed under the previous regime or during the 
armed conflict. These Tribunals completed their work on February 19th, 1981. A total of 
1,790 prisoners were released by means of pardon or dismissal, 229 were acquitted, and 
4,331 were sentenced. In an act demonstrating a willingness to comply with international 
human rights standards, the Government of National Reconstruction issued a series of 
pardons for 503 male detainees and 72 women detainees.65 However, the Commission 
found that many of the procedural aspects of the tribunals did not comply with 
international due process standards. 
 First, the accused were denied habeas corpus and a legal hearing before a judge, 
which was supposed to assess the legality of their detention. This created an “irregular 
legal situation” which allowed prisoners to be detained for prolonged periods of time 
without the benefit of a trial. This was a direct violation of the rights to liberty and a just 
trial. Prisoners were denied the presumption of innocence—the Tribunals shifted the 
burden of proof to the accused and assumed that membership in the former National 
Guard was sufficient evidence to presume guilt.66 
The Commission found that some people were arrested simply because they were 
members of the National Guard, without a specific description of the crimes they 
allegedly committed. If a person had freely enlisted in the National Guard, he or she was 
automatically indicted, and the indictment would be  filled with generalized statements 
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about loyalty to an oppressive regime. In the opinion of the Special Tribunals, 
membership in the National Guard (regardless of occupation or rank) amounted to 
complicity in the commission of massacres, murder of civilians, and widespread 
brutality.67 A typical case involved Lt. Col. Byron Pineda Galo, whose job as a 
bureaucrat in the supply office kept him far from any military functions or combat. 
However, his indictment states: 
..his status as the individual in charge of the supplies of the Air Force gave 
him an opportunity to demonstrate his unwavering obedience and loyalty 
to Somoza and his cabal, by dropping 1,500-pound bombs on the civilian 
population and massive machine-gunning thereof…The rubble in our 
cities today and the thousands and thousands of innocent people who died, 
the brutally mutilated bodies, massacred during the heavy bombings, are 
living proof of the destruction he wrought.68 
Since he held a desk position, Galo was not the perpetrator of mass executions or 
the dropping of bombs on cities. The Commission pointed out that indictments had to be 
precise in describing the events which comprised commission of a crime, because such 
vagueness opened the door to judicial abuse.69 
In many cases, preparation for the trial was exceedingly short. The accused were 
given only 24 hours to prepare a defense. This virtually impossible feat was compounded 
by the court’s use of uncorroborated evidence, whose admissibility was determined by 
the members of the Special Tribunals “by assessing it according to their conscience.” 
Finally, only three days were allowed for the prisoners to file an appeal, and judgments 
were pronounced in three days.  Attorneys were often ill-prepared, and faced heavy 
prejudice for defending ex-National Guardsmen. In the Commission’s opinion, these 
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faulty mechanisms could lead to the opposite result than the one sought by the 
Tribunals—determining the truthfulness of allegations and the punishment of guilty 
parties by means of a fair trial.70 
Finally, the Special Tribunals were designed to hear crimes described in the Penal 
Code, which was usually the responsibility of the Supreme Court and the regular courts. 
The government ignored the recommendations of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court 
stated, “…we think it neither useful nor advisable, because it creates another agency, that, 
given its similarity to the Office of the Attorney General and its members.”71 The 
intention of the Supreme Court was to avoid redundancy and confusion in the legal 
system, and to maintain the integrity of the current legal structure. This duality allowed 
for the military to oversee the administration of justice, which, according to Loveman, 
also makes “Latin American democracy permanently insecure.”72 
The Commission declared that these trials’ proceedings were “incompatible with 
Nicaragua’s commitments under the American Convention of Human Rights.”73 The 
nature of the crimes committed did not exclude the accused from the guarantees of due 
process, because the accused were left with little or no means of defense. The 
Commission recommended that Special Tribunal decisions be reviewed by a higher 
judicial body. This review never came to pass, once again showing the waning influence 
of the Commission over this increasingly solid government. 
 The Commission was thus able to help design a legal system that protected the 
rights of ordinary Nicaraguans, but it was not able to persuade the government to alter the 
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proceedings of the Special Tribunals. Although the anger of the population was 
understandable, making exceptions with regards to due process in order to try a specific 
group is a slippery slope—it demonstrates a disregard for the sanctity of the law, and a 
willingness to change public policy to satisfy a short-term political agenda. This was a 
feature of the previous regime, and the Commission was not successful in weeding it out 
of the new system. 
Freedom of Thought and Expression 
 During the Commission’s 1981 on-site visit, several newspapers were closed 
down temporarily, including La Prensa, El Nuevo Diario and El Pueblo.74 Although the 
Fundamental Statute guaranteed freedom of thought, oral and written, as well as political 
organization, the Commission uncovered two decrees which limited the media, for 
reasons of “national security.” The decrees include statements prohibiting journalists 
from serving “unpopular interests,” or publishing “propaganda against peace”.75 
According to the Inter-American Press Association, these laws were a severe handicap to 
the practice of independent journalism, and the Association and the Commission 
requested that the government revoke these measures. The government refused to 
cooperate.76 
The Commission noted that according to international law, the freedom of the 
press is inviolable unless the security of the State is “truly compromised.” Limitations 
must be temporary and unambiguous. Any other decrees by government authorities are 
considered a “risk to the freedom of expression set forth in Article 13 of the American 
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Convention on Human Rights. In addition, because the Nicaraguan Penal Code’s Article 
260 sanctioned any hindrance of the flow of information, as well as the right of 
expression, Decrees 511 and 512 constituted a legislative contradiction.”77 
The 1978 assassination of Chamorro, a prominent figure in the press corps, 
provoked widespread anti-government protest. Evidently, the Nicaraguan press had a 
strong influence on public opinion and could spur the population into action. A fear of the 
power of the press may have been the reason for such stringent regulation of the flow of 
information, including the closing down of major newspapers. However, the new 
government’s reasons for censoring the press were very similar to those of the Somoza 
regime. Despite the commitment to freedom of expression outlined in the Penal Code, the 
government was unwilling to follow through with full press freedom despite the requests 
of the Commission. 
Political Rights and Ideological Pluralism 
 The Government of National Reconstruction, as outlined in the Preamble of the 
Fundamental Statute, was designed to restore tranquility in Nicaragua, reconfigure 
governmental structure, and to institute a democratic system, with the presumption of 
ideological pluralism.78 However, after two years of existence, the Junta experienced a 
major split because of political differences between the members. Specifically, several 
members were dissatisfied with changes made in the Council of State, which represented 
a wide range of political parties. The problem was a reconfiguration of the Council that 
eliminated certain parties and admitted a plethora of groups affiliated with the FSLN. 
This predominance of Sandinista groups seemed to foreshadow a complete takeover of 
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the government by the Sandinista party. Sandinista leaders retorted that those in 
opposition were “in agreement with counter-revolutionary conspiracy plans.”79 
In addition, Commander Daniel Ortega, member of the Junta and a high-ranking 
party official for the FSLN, stated in 1980 that elections were imminent. However, his 
brother and fellow commander Humberto Ortega announced in August of that year that 
elections would not take place until 1985. In his speech, he stated: 
…One year after the Revolution, we can responsibly say that the country’s 
backwardness and its economic, social, and moral destruction are so 
profound and widespread that the nation cannot be expected to be 
reconstructed before 1985; the national Directorate of the Sandinista Front 
has therefore decided that the GOVERNMENT JUNTA must continue to 
lead the work of government until 1985.80 
The Commanders’ decision to postpone elections raised fears that the Sandinista 
party was consolidating its hold on power and undermining the democratic process. 
These fears were compounded on August 28th, 1980, when the Council of State adopted a 
law prohibiting any party from engaging in political campaigning prior to 1984.81 
Minority parties responded via La Prensa, in a paid advertisement which read, “The 
FSLN is in fact a political party, but it avoids defining itself as such, causing confusion 
between the Government, the party and the FSLN.”82 
The Commission warned that the processes of “streamlining” governmental 
institutions to limit them to FSLN representatives, and the packing of the Council of State 
with FSLN groups, was a practice contrary to political tolerance. The postponement of 
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elections until 1985 threatened the existence of “an authentically democratic system.”83 
Although elections could not, of course, take place immediately after a Revolution, 
prohibiting campaigning for four years and setting such a far-off date for an election was 
not an appropriate method for creating a representative democracy.84 
The Commission’s Conclusions and Recommendations 
 Despite the Junta’s commitment to human rights in the legal and administrative 
infrastructure of the Government of National Reconstruction, in practice many problems 
were evident—problems which put the creation of a democracy at risk. With respect to 
the Special Tribunals, the Commission called for a thorough investigation of the 
proceedings by the Supreme Court. The Commission also asked the Junta and the State 
Council promote freedom of political organization and the protection of political rights, 
regardless of affiliation. 
 The judicial system had to be restructured, and at the time of transition the only 
institution intact and organized enough to take over public administration was the 
military. However, a lack of regulation of the Sandinista Popular Army resulted in abuse. 
Loveman notes with regards to military control in transition governments, “More than 
ever before, the armed forces have become the un-elected but constitutionally designated 
political arbiters of the new democracies.”85 
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IV. SUBSEQUENT REPORTS BY THE COMMISSION ON NICARAGUA  
On the 20th of September, 1982, the OAS published its annual report, which 
included a chapter on the human rights situation in Nicaragua.86 The Commission noted 
that the new regime had not carried out the promised investigations on summary 
executions. In addition, despite complaints received by the Commission with regards to 
violations of due process, there had been no review of the decisions of the Special 
Tribunals. Finally, with regards to political pluralism, the FSLN took no measures to 
create a climate of equality and solidarity between parties. 
 As power was consolidated into the hands of the FSLN, the recommendations of 
the Commission were increasingly disregarded. The Commission’s role was reduced after 
the creation of an interim government structure.  
 It was not until 1988 that the Commission’s influence over Nicaraguan affairs 
began to increase once again, as the result of a visit during that year described the 
Commission’s annual report.87 This visit occurred after a prolonged state of emergency, 
which was lifted in January, 1988 after a conference of the five Central American 
presidents. However, many factions within Nicaragua opposed ending the state of 
emergency, due to the continuing armed conflict between the Sandinista government and 
a group of insurgents known popularly as the “contras”. There were allegations that the 
lifting of the state of emergency endangered the population. The Commission argued that 
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this change did amount to a positive development, because many basic rights were 
restored to the people, and the government’s functioning would return to normalcy: 
The Commission considers the lifting of the state of emergency to be a 
positive step.  In addition to restoring the validity of rights the exercise of 
which had been suspended, this move helps to consolidate the peace 
process, and thereby, bring about conditions more conducive to furthering 
the effective observance of human rights in Nicaragua. The specific effect 
that the lifting of the state of emergency has had is to restore the full 
validity of the remedy of habeas corpus, an area to which the Commission 
has made reference in its previous annual reports.88 
The Commission was also assigned the role of witness and monitor of the 
agreements reached by the government and the Nicaraguan Resistance, or “contras,” 
during this period, known as the Sapoa Accords. This agreement called for a cease fire, 
an amnesty, freedom of expression and “the incorporation of the Resistance into the 
democratization process underway.”89 As the government once again began to change 
hands, and the role of the Commission became more important. 
 At the end of the 1980’s, the Sandinista control over government administration 
and public support was dwindling, due in part to the contra insurgency, but also because 
of a negative backlash against Sandinista public policy. In addition, it is important to note 
that post-authoritarian democracies in Latin America faced extreme economic hardship. 
Loveman notes, “The fledgling democracies…had to face the most severe economic 
challenges since the Great Depression…plus the institutional legacies established by 
departing military regimes.”90 In 1989, the Commission published another commentary 
on the human rights situation in Nicaragua, and given the delicate political situation, it is 
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not surprising to find that the government once again became much more open and 
cooperative with the Inter-American Commission. 91 
Right to life cases regarding extrajudicial executions carried out by the Sandinista 
Popular Army were brought to the attention of the Commission. At the Commission’s 
request, the government mounted several investigations and many suspects were 
sentenced to prison terms of up to thirty years. The Commission expressed its satisfaction 
and encouraged the continued investigation of such incidents. 
 Because of the Commission’s preoccupation with the denial of habeas corpus 
during the state of emergency, the government amended the constitution to protect this 
right. The Commission recommended that this right should be observed for all citizens 
and not denied to suspected criminals, as occurred during the tribunals against 
Somocistas. 
 President Daniel Ortega passed a series of reforms to promote pluralism in the 
electoral system. Pardons were issued for people imprisoned by the Special Justice 
Tribunals, with the exception of 39 people, whom the Commission demanded should be 
released. The government continued investigations of military personnel accused of 
violating the right to life. 
 A presidential election was scheduled for 1990, and the Commission stated that it 
would judge the election’s legitimacy according to the level of political and judicial 
freedom in the country, including the rights of freedom of expression. The National 
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Assembly complied with a Commission request to curb the powers of the Ministry of the 
Interior, especially its regulation of the media. 
 The presidential candidates for the election were announced, and the main 
contenders were the FSLN, with Daniel Ortega Saavedra as their candidate, and the 
Unión Nicaragüense Opositora (UNO), which chose Violeta Barrios de Chamorro as their 
candidate. On February 21st, 1990, Chamorro defeated the incumbent president, signaling 
yet another change in the political direction of the country. This transition led to the 
initiation of new human rights programs, including the creation of an Office of the 
Special Prosecutor for Human Rights, subsidiary to the Attorney-General.92 
In 1992, the Commission once again visited Nicaragua, and noted a series of 
institutional problems which resembled to the practices of the previous Sandinista 
government. Once again, the government had regressed, curtailing many rights. The 
judicial system of the Sandinista government was gutted—70% of the judges from the 
previous government were replaced. A new problem a land appropriation program that 
took place in early 1990, in which the Sandinistas redistributed privately-owned property, 
popularly known as the “Piñata.”93 Unfortunately, many people were deprived of their 
property, and the process of compensation or reacquisition was unevenly handled and led 
to a bitter dispute among branches of the government.  
 The Commission once again found the country in an unsettled state, despite the 
slow democratization process and the steps taken to establish a constitutional system that 
respected human rights during the transition period. It concluded: 
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Commission on Human Rights – 1992-1993.  Available from 
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…the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights finds that in the period 
covered by this Annual Report [1990-1992], some progress has been made 
in the promotion and protection of human rights. However, it is the 
Commission's view that in that same period, violence in the country has 
become worse.  There has also been a disturbing deterioration in the political 
situation and unhealthy feuding between the branches of government, all to 
the detriment of the human rights situation.  Contributing to this is the failure 
to identify and punish those responsible for serious crimes committed since 
this Administration took office and the magnification of an institutional crisis 
of alarming proportions.94 
V. CONCLUSION 
Despite the presence of a viable framework for the discussion and implementation 
of human rights principles among OAS member states, democracies in many Latin 
American countries continue to reflect authoritarian legacies within their new electoral 
systems. Old authoritarian policies have been transplanted into the governmental system, 
crippling the adjudication and punishment of human rights abuses. One of the most 
noticeable findings in the Commission reports regarding Nicaragua is that some issues 
consistently re-emerge, even after the establishment of “democracy.” Loveman refers to 
these “protected democracies” as a façade for the perpetuation of authoritarian power:  
One of the most enduring victories of the authoritarian regimes that 
installed themselves in the post 1964-era has been their ability to 
legitimize these anti-democratic practices by embedding them in 
constitutions and so-called organic laws, thus ensuring their survival and 
constituting a drag on civil power.95 
Authoritarian regimes utilized two tools to institutionalize military power and 
undemocratic policies, each of which blocks the protection of human rights. The first is 
governance through a “regime of exception”, or political scenarios in which civil rights 
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are curtailed. Regimes of exception include the proclamation of a state-of-siege, a state of 
emergency, the suspension of habeas corpus or rule by presidential decree.96 The second 
set of tools are laws designed to give the military increased autonomy and power, which 
allow the military branch to control other branches of government for the sake of 
“national security”. This permits the army to intervene and repress any opposition group 
in the name of the government. Only the military can control the military, thus effectively 
avoiding prosecution for human rights abuse when members of the armed forces threaten 
to return to a militaristic regime if they are brought to trial.97 
As Brian Loveman notes, “…even though democracy may have been on the rise 
[in Latin America at the end of the 20th century], it had hardly been consolidated.”98 In a 
democracy that upholds the repressive policies of previous regimes, there is no place to 
turn for those who have suffered abuse and repression.99 
It would seem that the answer to this problem would be the sort of monitoring and 
investigation prepared by the Commission, with the backing of the Organization of 
American States. However, the OAS often  finds itself largely powerless, especially when 
faced with a securely entrenched regime. Such regimes can successfully argue that 
intervention, even multilateral intervention, constitutes a violation of sovereignty. 
 The question then becomes, “when exactly is the Inter-American Commission of 
Human Rights effective and useful?” On the surface, it seems as though the 
Commission’s experience in Nicaragua was negative—it failed to change Somoza’s 
human rights policies, it noted the same offenses being committed by the subsequent 
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regime, and it noticed the same issues arising in the early 1990s. However, careful study 
of the annual reports reveals a new approach to developing a human rights ethic in 
Nicaragua, and serves as a model for the development of human rights in other Latin 
American countries. The Commission investigated government policy decisions, 
addressed grievances by victims of abuse, made recommendations on improvement and 
published their findings to inform the international community. The method carried out 
by the Commission was nuanced, but demonstrated over two decades that gradual 
progress was possible without infringing on state sovereignty. 
 Despite the fact that the Commission had little effect on the Somoza 
government’s domestic policy, it is evident that the international community was 
extremely alarmed by the findings of the 1978 Report. Member states were compelled to 
denounce the legitimacy of a government which had been in power since 1937. The 
Commission succeeded in undermining international support for the Somoza regime. In 
his final letter to the Nicaraguan people, Somoza cites the OAS’ decision as a main factor 
in his resignation. This was a direct result of the Commission’s efforts. 
 In addition, the new Government of National Reconstruction allowed to 
Commission to help draft the “Plan to Achieve Peace.” The power of the Commission did 
not necessarily lie in its ability to affect the policy of the Somoza government, but in its 
interest in establishing a human rights framework after the 1979 Revolution. Much of the 
legislation that was passed during this period, as the Commission noted, demonstrates an 
eagerness to respect human rights. This may have been an attempt by the new 
government to legitimize itself before the international community; but whatever the 
reason may have been, the legal system improved drastically in accordance with 
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international human rights principles. This constituted an important step in the 
implementation of human rights practices. 
 In practice, the Revolution in 1979 did not result in immediate respect for human 
rights. Many of the events that occurred in the three years following the triumph of the 
Revolution constituted flagrant abuses of basic rights. For example, the Special Tribunals 
may have unfairly sentenced hundreds of prisoners who were denied due process.  The 
FSLN consolidated power and hindered the establishment of a pluralistic political system. 
Media outlets were censored. Of course, the Commission had to consider that Nicaragua 
had just come out of a particularly bloody civil war, after a very long dictatorial regime, 
and therefore had to adjust to many unfamiliar democratic processes. Despite this 
understandable fact, the Organization of American States feared that Nicaragua was once 
again becoming authoritarian. This turned out to be a well-founded fear, because the 
FSLN did become, in essence, a new, very different authoritarian regime. However, the 
Sandinista government did not engage in the kind of human rights abuses and disregard 
for human life that the Somoza regime practiced. The process was slow, but progress was 
evident, especially in Nicaragua’s judicial and criminal justice systems. 
 Finally, the election of Violeta Barrios de Chamorro in 1990 demonstrated a 
definitive move towards more democratic electoral principles. Many of the 
Commission’s recommendations were taken into account after the election and the new 
administration expanded the human rights infrastructure of the government. The 
Commission noted that there was still much room for improvement, but expressed 
satisfaction at the progress that had been made. Although the country continues to 
grapple with human rights issues to this day,  in a mere two decades the political climate 
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has changed drastically. In 1978, Nicaragua was immersed in war, fighting against severe 
repression. Twelve years later, a democratic election led to a bloodless transition of 
power and a climate of ideological pluralism that continues to develop and thrive. 
 It was never necessary for the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights to 
infringe on Nicaragua’s sovereignty. Its continued interest in the region, relentless 
investigations and recommendations, and its reputation and influence within the 
international diplomatic community gave the Commission sufficient leverage to help 
transform Nicaragua into a democracy that is increasingly committed to promoting 
human rights.  
Despite the problematic issue of nonintervention, the importance of respect for 
state sovereignty, and the constitutional obstacles inherent in protected democracies, the 
Inter-American System has contributed to the peaceful democratization processes in 
some nations during periods of transition. In addition, the system has created a forum 
where human rights can be discussed and enforced. It is undeniable that this movement 
continues to be fraught with problems of compliance and enforcement through diplomatic 
pressure. Nevertheless, the invaluable contributions of the human rights bodies of the 
Organization of American States have resulted in significant improvements in the policy 
decisions of new democracies, and fomented an increased respect for human rights in 
Nicaragua. 
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